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Attorneys for Plaintiff DYLAN YEISER-FODNESS

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DYLAN YEISER-FODNESS, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

MASTER DOG TRAINING, a California Corporation; 5 STAR K-9 ACADEMY, INC., a California Corporation: **EKATERINA** KOROTUN, individual; and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 22STCV21852


Assigned for All Purposes to: The Hon. Armen Tamzarian, Dept. 52

PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO VACATE ORDER **COMPELLING ARBITRATION PER** CCP § 1281.97 AND LIFT STAY, AND FOR AN AWARD OF MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF \$16,605.65 AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND **AUTHORITIES**

August 18, 2023 Date:

9:00 a.m. Time: Place: Dept. 52 RES ID: 086055158446

[Filed Concurrently with Declaration of Young W. Ryu in Support Thereof; and [Proposed] Order]



I. TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD HEREIN:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 18, 2023, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 52 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse located at 111 N. Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, Plaintiff DYLAN YEISER-FODNESS will move for an order vacating the order compelling arbitration pursuant to CCP § 1281 et seq.

This motion is based on the notice, the memorandum of points and authorities, the declaration of Young W. Ryu, the exhibits, the proposed order, the court file, and any argument that the Court may receive.

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DATED: July 6, 2023

LOYR, APC

By:_

Young W. Ryu, Esq.

Zachariah E. Moura, Esq.

Timothy Travers, Esq.

Kee Seok Mah, Esq.

Attorneys for Plaintiff DYLAN YEISER-

FODNESS

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AN AUTHORITIES

II. INTRODUCTION

Defendants Master Dog Training, 5 Star K-9 Academy, Inc., and Ekaterina Korotun ("Defendants") compelled Plaintiff Dylan Yeiser-Fodness ("Plaintiff") to individual arbitration and out of proceeding with his lawsuit in this Court. Defendants are under a legal obligation to pay their portion of the arbitration fees for the individual arbitrations and have timely failed to do so. Plaintiff is entitled to a lift of the stay in his case and an order permitting him to proceed with his claims in this Court. The law permits nothing else. In essence, Plaintiff is entitled to elect his remedy upon Defendants' failure to pay the fees and costs in the arbitration within thirty (30) days of the arbitrator's invoice due date. Code of Civil Procedure ("CCP") §1281.97. Among those remedies is the termination of the arbitration proceedings, allowing Plaintiff to pursue his claims in this Court. This is the remedy Plaintiff has elected. CCP §1281.97(b)(l).

There is no question that the elements of CCP §1281.97(a) have been met. This is an employment arbitration that required, expressly or through application of law and/or the rules of the arbitration provider (here, AAA, per party agreement) that Defendants pay certain fees and costs during the initiation of the arbitration proceeding. Defendants failed to timely pay those fees and as of June 29, 2023, and as a result, Plaintiff has exercised his unilateral right to withdraw from arbitration proceedings to pursue his claims in this Court per CCP §1281.97(a). The express and unequivocal language of CCP §1281.97(a) provides that "if the fees or costs to initiate an arbitration proceeding are not paid within 30 days after the due date the drafting party is in material breach of the arbitration agreement, is in default of the arbitration, and waives its right to compel arbitration under Section 1281.2." CCP § 1281.97(a)(1) (emphasis added). In the event of Defendants' material breach and default under CCP §1281.97(a), then "the employee may. . . withdraw the claim from arbitration and proceed in a court of appropriate jurisdiction." CCP §1281.97(b)(1) (emphasis added).

This is exactly what happened here, and Plaintiff is unilaterally entitled to elect his remedy, to withdraw from the arbitration and proceed with this action in this Court. By the express terms of the statute, this is not a discretionary issue for the Court nor is a permissive standard applied before allowing Plaintiff to elect his remedy. Rather, the election is expressly the employee's prerogative to make.

Further, sanctions are mandatory insofar as CCP §1281.99 provides that when the drafting party of the underlying arbitration agreement is in material breach of the agreement pursuant to CCP §1281.97(a), the court shall order it "to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees and costs, incurred by the employee . . . as a result of the material breach." CCP §1281.99. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to vacate the order compelling arbitration and return the matter to the trial court for adjudication as a result of Defendants' failure to pay the filing fee within 30 days of the deadlines should be granted.

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff filed the instant action against Defendants on April 7, 2023, asserting several claims of retaliation and wrongful termination, as well as several Labor Code violations. (Ryu Decl. ¶4). Specifically, Plaintiff was subjected to retaliation due to his complaints about Defendants' unlawful business practices and for not being properly compensated for missed meal and rest periods. (Ryu Decl. ¶5).

On October 14, 2022, Defendants filed a motion to compel the matter to arbitration and to stay all proceedings. On November 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed his opposition to this motion contending, among other things, that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. On November 30, 2022, the Court issued a ruling denying Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration because default had already been entered against 5 Star K-9 Academy, Inc. (Ryu Decl. ¶6).

On March 19, 2023, Defendants filed another motion to compel the matter to arbitration and to stay all proceedings. On April 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed another opposition to this motion contending, among other things, that the arbitration agreement was

unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. On May 9, 2023, the Court issued a ruling granted Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration. (Ryu Decl. ¶7).

On May 16, 2023, Plaintiff submitted his timely demand for arbitration with a copy of Defendants' Arbitration Agreement and this Court's order compelling the parties to arbitration to AAA. (Ryu Decl. ¶8).

On May 30, 2023, AAA acknowledged receipt of the demand and accepted matter for arbitration. AAA issued an original invoice to Defendants for \$2,100.00 to serve as a non-refundable filing fee, noting that "payment is due upon receipt." All parties were in receipt of this invoice. (Ryu Decl. ¶9).

AAA's invoice also noted that "payment must be paid by June 29, 2023 or the AAA will close the parties' case." (Ryu Decl. ¶9). By June 29, 2023, Defendants had not paid their filing fee. (Ryu Decl. ¶10).

On July 5, 2023, AAA notified both parties with a letter saying it was closing the file on this matter due to Defendants not paying their filing fee on time pursuant to CCP §1281.97. (Ryu Decl. ¶10).

IV. THE COURT IS EMPOWERED TO INSURE THE ORDERLY CONDUCT OF PROCEEDINGS

Code of Civil Procedure Section 128 provides that every court shall have the power to do the following: to preserve order in its immediate presence; to enforce order in the proceedings before it; and to provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it.

Additionally, all courts have inherent supervisory or administrative powers which enable them to carry out their duties, and which exist apart from any statutory authority. Rutherford v. Owen-Illinois (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 272, 287-288. Courts have inherent power to adopt any method of practice if the procedure is not specified by statute or by rules adopted by the Judicial Council. Citizens Utilities Co. v. Superior Court (1963) 59 Cal.2d 805, 812-813. This inherent power entitles trial courts to exercise reasonable control over all proceedings connected with pending litigation in order to insure the orderly administration of justice.

See, Hays v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal.2d 260, 264-265. Thus, courts are allowed to decide the order in which issues are to be decided as this decision is left to their sound discretion. See, In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 621.

V. DEFENDANTS' FAILURE TO PAY THE ARBITRATION FEES WITHIN THE TIME FRAME SET FORTH IN CCP SECTION 1281.98 MANDATES WITHDRAWAL FROM ARBITRATION

On October 13, 2019, SB 707 was signed into law and became effective on January 1, 2020. It amended the California Code of Civil Procedure and added sections 1281.97 through 1281.99. Section 1281.97 covers failure to pay fees and costs before arbitration can proceed, such as the case here. It holds the following in pertinent part:

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- (a)(1) In an employment or consumer arbitration that requires, either expressly or through application of state or federal law or the rules of the arbitration provider, the drafting party to pay certain fees and costs before the arbitration can proceed, if the fees or costs to initiate an arbitration proceeding are not paid within 30 days after the due date the drafting party is in material breach of the arbitration agreement, is in default of the arbitration, and waives its right to compel arbitration under Section 1281.2.
- (2) After an employee or consumer meets the filing requirements necessary to initiate an arbitration, the arbitration provider shall immediately provide an invoice for any fees and costs required before the arbitration can proceed to all of the parties to the arbitration. The invoice shall be provided in its entirety, shall state the full amount owed and the date that payment is due, and shall be sent to all parties by the same means on the same day. To avoid delay, absent an express provision in the arbitration agreement stating the number of days in which the parties to the arbitration must pay any required fees or costs, the arbitration provider shall issue all invoices to the parties as due upon receipt.

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When, as in here, there is a material breach of the arbitration agreement, the employee may either "(1) [w]ithdraw the claim from arbitration and proceed in a court of appropriate jurisdiction" or "(2) [c]ompel arbitration in which the drafting party shall pay reasonable attorney's fees and costs related to the arbitration." CCP §1281.97(b). This

statute was passed because California's lawmakers observed "a concerning and troubling trend" in recent years undermining the goal of expedient proceedings in arbitration. The very parties imposing mandatory arbitration provisions in contracts of adhesion (usually in employment and consumer contexts) have then refused to pay the fees required to commence the proceedings. This practice "effectively stymie[s] the ability of [claimants] to assert their legal rights." S. Judiciary Comm. Hr'g on SB 707, 2019–2020, at 6 (Cal. Apr. 23, 2019). The amendments thus sought to "deter drafting parties from reneging on their obligation to "pay" and "ensur[e] that the party that drafts the arbitration agreement cannot delay adjudication of a dispute by refusing to participate in, or pay for, arbitration." Assemb. Judiciary Comm. Hr'g on SB 707, 2019-2020 at 1, 5, 8 (Cal. June 18, 2019). The legislature explicitly declared "[i]t is the intent of the Legislature . . . to affirm the decision in . . . Sink v. Aden Enterprises, Inc. that a company's failure to pay arbitration fees . . . constitutes a breach of the arbitration agreement and allows the non-breaching party to bring a claim in court." 4 SB 707 § 1(f).

Notably, the right to withdraw the action from arbitration is unilaterally Plaintiff's, and there is no exception in the statute permitting Defendants to avoid the consequences of their failure to pay the arbitrator's invoice within 30 days of its due date. Defendants will likely argue that their violation of CCP Section 1281.97 should be excused because their delay did not cause any prejudice or specific harm to Plaintiff or was an error. Defendants will also likely argue the fact that they thought they paid the fee on time, but some unforeseen misfortune caused error or delay. For the reasons discussed below, both arguments fail, and this action must be returned to the trial court for adjudication.

VI. DEFENDATNS MATERIALLY BREACHED THE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT BY FAILING TO PAY THE ARBITRATION FEES AND
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO REMOVE THE MATTER FROM
ARBITRATION

By failing to pay their arbitration fees within 30 days of their May 30, 2023 due date, Defendants, and each of them, have materially breached the arbitration agreement and Plaintiff is entitled to remove the matter from arbitration pursuant to CCP section 1281.97.

Here, the communications from AAA make it clear that Defendants failed to pay the invoice issued on May 30, 2023, and due "upon receipt" and thereafter. (Ryu Decl. ¶¶9-10). The 30 days lapsed on June 29, 2023. Thus, the fact that Defendants failed to timely pay their fees is undisputed and any effort by Defendants to characterize their failure to pay as a "mistake" or "nonprejudicial" is of no consequence. If the law permitted exceptions for error or mistake, then CCP 1281.97 would be meaningless. It is Defendants' duty to ensure that their payments are timely made to AAA, not Plaintiff's duty to inform Defendants of their failure to do so. AAA even provides a safe and secure electronic payment method, which is most commonly used.

It is clear that the Defendants do not take the allegations of the complaint seriously and seeks to ignore their obligations. Plaintiff has waited patiently to adjudicate his case. The plain language of CCP Section 1281.97 mandates withdrawal of the case from arbitration at Plaintiff's request under these circumstances. Defendants' failure to pay the arbitrator's invoice upon receipt or within the 30 days following receipt of the invoice, constitutes a material breach of the arbitration agreement pursuant under CCP Section 1281.97.

CCP §1281.97 is applicable and is clear and explicit. The statute expressly permits plaintiff to withdraw from an arbitration with no preconditions or limitations. Regardless of whether Defendants eventually paid the fees, the Court should find as other trial courts have found, that the employment arbitration required, either expressly or through application of state or federal law or the rules of the arbitration provider, that Defendants pay certain fees and costs during the pendency of the arbitration proceeding and that the fees required to continue the arbitration proceeding were not paid within 30 days after the due date. Thus, Defendants are in material breach of the arbitration agreement, are in

arbitration as a result of their material breach. Respectfully, this court should find that Plaintiff unilaterally elected to withdraw the matter from arbitration.

VII. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER HIS ATTORNEYS FEES AND

VII. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER HIS ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS FOR THE ARBITRATION AND SANCTIONS RELATING TO DEFENDANTS' MATERIAL BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT

default of the arbitration, and have waived their right to compel Plaintiff to proceed with

As set forth in both CCP Sections 1281.97, 1281.98 and 1281.99, a Defendant employer shall pay monetary sanctions to an employee who elects to remove an action from arbitration following the material breach by the Defendant employer and proceeds in a court of appropriate jurisdiction. CCP 1281.97(d) & 1281.98(c). In the present case, Plaintiff makes his request for attorneys' fees, costs, interest, and any evidentiary sanctions, as permitted under Section 1281.98(b)(1), which provides: "(1) The employee or consumer may bring a motion, or a separate action, to recover all attorney's fees and all costs associated with the abandoned arbitration proceeding. The recovery of arbitration fees, interest, and related attorney's fees shall be without regard to any findings on the merits in the underlying action or arbitration."

Under section 1281.98(d), A material breach of the arbitration agreement for failure to timely pay initiating fees, "[i]f the employee or consumer proceeds with an action in a court of appropriate jurisdiction, **the court shall impose sanctions** on the drafting party in accordance with Section 1281.99." (emphasis added). Section 1281.99 provides,

(a) The court shall impose a monetary sanction against a drafting party that materially breaches an arbitration agreement pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 1281.97 or subdivision (a) of Section 1281.98, by ordering the drafting party to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees and costs, incurred by the employee or consumer as a result of the material breach.

It further provides for evidentiary, terminating and contempt sanctions, "unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that

other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust." Cal. Civ. Proc. § 1281.99(b).

Plaintiff's fees and costs associated with opposing Defendants' motion to compel arbitration, initiating arbitration, and in filing this Motion are \$16,605.65. [Ryu Decl., ¶¶ 12-14.] Plaintiff requests monetary sanctions in that amount.

VIII. CONCLUSION.

As the foregoing demonstrates, Defendants have materially breached the arbitration agreement by failing to pay the arbitrator's deposit within 30 days of the May 30, 2023 invoice. Plaintiff is entitled to remove the matter from arbitration and recover his attorneys' fees and costs associated with the arbitration and arising from the breach of the agreement. There is no "excusable neglect" exception, nor can Defendants offer any permissible excuse to avoid the mandates of CCP 1281.97-99. Plaintiff respectfully requests an Order, pursuant to CCP 1281.97(b)(1), granting this relief and reinstating this matter to the civil Court.

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DATED: July 6, 2023

LOYR, APC

Young W. Ryu, Esq.

Zachariah E. Moura, Esq.

Timothy Travers, Esq.

Kee Seok Mah, Esq.

Attorneys for Plaintiff, DYLAN YEISER-FODNESS

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Make a Reservation

DYLAN YEISER-FODNESS vs MASTER DOG TRAINING, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al.

Case Number: 22STCV21852 Case Type: Civil Unlimited Category: Wrongful Termination

Date Filed: 2022-07-06 Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 52

Reservation

Case Name:

DYLAN YEISER-FODNESS vs MASTER DOG TRAINING, Case Number: A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 22STCV21852

Type:

Motion to Vacate (ORDER COMPELLING ARBITRATION Status:

PER CCP § 1281.98, AND LIFT STAY) **RESERVED**

Filing Party: Location:

Dylan Yeiser-Fodness (Plaintiff) Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 52

Date/Time: Number of Motions:

08/18/2023 9:00 AM 1

Reservation ID: Confirmation Code:

CR-EMSKU3FRCZJDIBUHB 086055158446

Fees

Description	Fee	Qty	Amount
Motion to Vacate (name extension)	60.00	1	60.00
Credit Card Percentage Fee (2.75%)	1.65	1	1.65
TOTAL			# /4 / F

TOTAL \$61.65

Payment

Amount: Type: \$61.65 Visa

Account Number: Authorization: XXXX6980 00165A

Payment Date:

1969-12-31

Print Receipt

★ Reserve Another Hearing



PROOF OF SERVICE

I am over 18 years old and not a party to this action. My business address is 1055

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West 7th Street, Suite 2290, Los Angeles, California 90017.

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On July 6, 2023, I served the following on the interested party as follows: PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO VACATE ORDER COMPELLING ARBITRATION PER CCP § 1281.97 AND LIFT STAY, AND FOR AN AWARD OF MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF \$16,605.65

AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

nfolevlaw@gmail.com

LAW OFFICES OF NATALIA FOLEY

751 S Weir Canvon Rd Ste 157-455 Anaheim, CA 92808

Attorney for Defendants

BY U.S. MAIL:

Natalia Foley

I enclosed the foregoing document in a sealed envelope to the interest parties at the address listed above and deposited the sealed envelope for collection and mailing following my firm's ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with my firm's business practices for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit.

■BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE:

My electronic service address is martha.gutierrez@loywr.com. Per the parties' agreement, through their respective counsel, to accept electronic service and pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6. I served the foregoing document on the interested party at the electronic service addresses (e-mail addresses) listed above and did not receive Notice of Failure.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration was executed on July 6, 2023, in Los Angeles, California.

Martha Gutierrez